Accrual components and stock trading costs  by Lei, Qianhua
China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 287–300Contents lists available at ScienceDirectChina Journal of Accounting Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /c jarAccrual components and stock trading costsq
Qianhua Lei
School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, China
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C TArticle history:
Received 24 October 2011
Accepted 3 September 2013
Available online 16 October 2013
Keywords:
Abnormal accruals
Normal accruals
Short-selling constraints
Stock trading costs1755-3091/$ - see front matter  2013 Produ
Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2013.09.001
E-mail address: leiqianhua@126.com
Production and hosting by
q This paper is sponsored by the National NThis paper examines the relationship between accrual components and stock
trading costs in China and ﬁnds that both abnormal and normal accruals
are associated with these costs. Moreover, negative accruals, both abnormal
and normal, have a greater inﬂuence on stock trading costs than positive
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ther analysis reveals that investors who are ﬁxated on accruals are unable to
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Additionally, investors overestimate the persistence of both positive and neg-
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between positive and negative accruals in the face of short-selling constraints in
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Trading cost savings are conducive to the eﬃcient allocation of capital in economic systems. Biais et al.
(2005) argue that the volume of transactions renders the overall economic system non-trivial, although the
trading cost involved in each transaction is small. The issue of trading cost savings is particularly signiﬁcant
in China because of its speculative stock market and high stock turnover rate. Such savings are also conducive
to investment returns. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) evaluate the performance of momentum tradingction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research.
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is 0.0061 (0.0054) in an equal-weighted momentum strategy, about 76.25% (67.50%) of the raw return
(0.0080).
The issue of whether the mispricing of accruals is costly to investors is of signiﬁcant importance to academ-
ics, practitioners, and regulators. Accruals provide investors with information on ﬁrm value, and their use can
alter the timing of cash ﬂow recognition in earnings, thereby mitigating the problem of noisy cash ﬂow mea-
surement and improving the accuracy of ﬁrm performance measurement, particularly when the interval of the
latter measurement is short, the volatility of the ﬁrm’s working capital requirements and investment and
ﬁnancing activities is great, and its operating cycle is long (Dechow, 1994). Some evidence suggests that inves-
tors have diﬃculty understanding the real ﬁrm value information embedded in accruals (Sloan, 1996; Xie,
2001; Richardson et al., 2005), which can increase stock trading costs because of information asymmetry
between informed and uninformed traders.
Several papers discuss the relationship between accrual quality and the bid-ask spread, but few consider
that between accrual components and stock trading costs. In addition, there is little research on the eﬀects
of normal accruals on stock trading costs or those of short-selling constraints on the relationship between
abnormal and normal accruals and these trading costs. Using A-share listed ﬁrms on Chinese stock exchanges
between 2004 and 2011, this paper empirically examines the relationship between accrual components and
stock trading costs in the face of short-selling constraints. The results show that (1) both abnormal and normal
accruals are associated with stock trading costs and (2) that negative abnormal and normal accruals have
stronger eﬀects on these costs than positive abnormal and normal accruals. This paper contributes to the lit-
erature by showing how short-selling constraints aﬀect the relationship between accruals and stock trading
costs.
The results of this paper also have several implications for accounting theory. First, accounting is an infor-
mation and measurement system that identiﬁes, records, and communicates relevant, reliable, and comparable
information about an organization’s real business activities (Ge, 2003). Many papers investigate the quality of
earnings in terms of their relevance, reliability, and comparability, but few document the real accounting goal
of reﬂecting an organization’s real business activities. The results reported in this paper indicate that trading
costs in the securities market increase if investors cannot understand an organization’s real business activities
(such as normal accruals). Second, in accrual-based accounting, accruals include numerous subjective judg-
ments and measurement errors. This paper provides empirical evidence showing that investors’ estimation
of ﬁrm value is biased by accrual measurement errors. Third, it also oﬀers empirical evidence to show that
the full disclosure suggested by the information perspective, regardless of the disclosure form, is limited under
weak-form stock market eﬃciency. Both the information and measurement perspectives should be considered
when examining accounting information.
This paper also has implications for securities regulation. For example, listed ﬁrms in China need to
strengthen their disclosure quality (e.g., by providing information on measurement methods and fundamental
earnings conditions) because of the country’s low degree of market eﬃciency. Doing so will reduce the infor-
mation asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors and lower stock market trading costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 pre-
sents the relevant background and posits hypotheses on the eﬀects of accrual components on stock trading
costs. The research design is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 reports
the results of additional analyses and robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
2.1. Literature on accrual mispricing
A number of studies present evidence to show that investors are naı¨ve and do not use the information avail-
able correctly in forecasting future ﬁrm performance (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Maines and Hand,
1996). Recent studies provide further empirical evidence of investors’ naı¨ve ﬁxation on reported earnings
by identifying the role of the information in the accrual components of current earnings in future earnings
forecasts. This evidence indicates that investors are unable to fully capture the information contained in var-
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accrual anomaly in the stock market, presenting evidence showing that stock prices place too great a weight on
accruals. Drawing on Mishkin (1983) and the hedge-portfolio test methods in Sloan (1996), Xie (2001) ﬁnds
the market to overestimate the persistence, or one-year-ahead earnings implications, of abnormal accruals,
consequently overpricing them. Richardson et al. (2005) extend Sloan (1996) work by linking accrual reliabil-
ity to earnings persistence. They show that less reliable accruals lead to less earnings persistence and that inves-
tors do not fully anticipate this lower degree of persistence, which leads to signiﬁcant security mispricing.
Chan et al. (2006) also investigate the market mispricing of accruals, ﬁnding that the mispricing of inventory
accruals is most serious of all accrual components. Examining the Chinese stock market, Zhang and Zhao
(2008) ﬁnd that Chinese investors also misprice less reliable accruals. Using the methods of Fama–MacBeth,
Song and Li (2009) ﬁnd that there is also an accrual anomaly in this stock market, although the mispricing of
earnings and earnings components are inconsistent with those in the US stock market.
2.2. Literature on accruals and stock trading costs
Accruals contain many subjective judgments, thus leading to information asymmetry between investors and
listed ﬁrms. Endogenous information acquisition theories hold that the incentives to acquire and exploit pri-
vate information are inversely related to the informativeness of public information (Grossman and Stiglitz,
1980; Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). The
relationship between trading costs and accrual components depends on the extent to which accruals contain
measurement error and the degree to which investors are unable to correctly interpret the fundamental
earnings component.
Only a few papers examine the relationship between accruals and stock trading costs either directly or indi-
rectly. Bhattacharya et al. (2008) demonstrate that poor earnings quality increases adverse selection risk, as
manifested in trading costs, and reduces liquidity in ﬁnancial markets. Both the innate and discretionary
components of earnings quality contribute signiﬁcantly to information asymmetry. Further, poor earnings
quality exacerbates information asymmetry around earnings announcements, particularly for ﬁrms whose
earnings represent the principal source of information available to market participants. Several papers
investigate the economic consequences of earnings quality using the bid-ask spread and the price impact as
dependent variables. Aﬄeck-Graves et al. (2002), for example, explore the relationship among earnings
predictability, information asymmetry, and the behavior of the adverse selection cost component of the
bid-ask spread around the quarterly earnings announcements of NASDAQ ﬁrms. They ﬁnd an increase in this
component on the day of and day prior to these announcements for ﬁrms with less predictable earnings. How-
ever, they ﬁnd no evidence of such a change among ﬁrms with more predictable earnings. Jayaraman (2008)
reports that bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading are higher both when earnings are
smoother than cash ﬂows and when they are more volatile than cash ﬂows. His additional tests suggest that
managers’ discretionary choices lead to smoother or more volatile earnings to a greater extent than cash ﬂows
garble information, although their non-discretionary choices do not. Lang et al. (2012) document lower trans-
action costs and greater liquidity for ﬁrms with greater transparency, and ﬁnd that the transparency–liquidity
relationship is more pronounced when overall investor uncertainty is greater.
3. Institutional background and hypothesis development
Dechow et al. (2010) show that reported accrual-based earnings are a function of unobservable fundamen-
tal earnings and the accounting measurement error term. Fundamental earnings, alternatively referred to as
perpetual earnings, can be thought of as the expected cash ﬂows generated during a period that can be annu-
itized to obtain the fundamental value of the ﬁrm. The error term represents the ability of the accounting sys-
tem to measure the ﬁrm’s fundamental earnings process. Similarly, the accrual component of earnings also
contains two components: fundamental accruals and error accruals.
Abnormal accruals are an important type of accounting measurement error. Some researchers argue that
managers communicate private information using abnormal accruals. Subramanyam (1996), for example, uses
the modiﬁed Jones model to measure abnormal accruals and ﬁnds them to have incremental information con-
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nicate private information on equity value. However, most work in this arena reports that managers use
abnormal accruals to manage earnings for their own private beneﬁt, thereby increasing the ﬁrm’s agency costs
(Francis et al., 1999) and the degree of information asymmetry between investors. Abnormal accruals in
China, in particular, appear to be opportunistic owing to the country’s weak investor protection and special
institutional arrangements (such as IPOs, SEOs, and ST). Wang and Lian (2010), for example, document sig-
niﬁcant abnormal accrual increases after China implemented a sponsor system, and Zhang (2010) ﬁnds evi-
dence of earnings management before private oﬀerings. He ﬁnds that the type of earnings management is
related to the type of private oﬀering. Zhang and Hu (2008) report that loss-making ﬁrms are more likely
to take “a big bath” in fourth-quarter ﬁnancial statements. Lei and Liu (2007) empirically test the relationship
between controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior and negative earnings management when ﬁrms experi-
ence a loss in their ﬁrst year. They ﬁnd that negative earnings management is serious when controlling share-
holders occupy funds. Overall, abnormal accruals are opportunistic in China, which garbles information.
Investors cannot correctly price obscure abnormal accruals if they are naı¨ve and ﬁxated on earnings (Xie,
2001), thereby leading to severe information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors.
However, the accrual anomaly identiﬁed by Sloan (1996) cannot be explained by the mispricing of abnor-
mal accruals alone. Normal accruals (non-discretionary accruals) can also be mispriced (Thomas and Zhang,
2002; Bradshaw et al., 2001). Chan et al. (2006) highlights two possible interpretations of the mispricing of
normal accruals. First, the psychology perspective suggests that individuals extrapolate past trends from short
histories too far into the future (Shleifer, 2000). For example, analysts and investors tend to weigh past growth
too heavily in their forecasts and valuations (e.g., De Bondt and Thaler, 1990; Chan et al., 2003). Normal
accruals (non-discretionary accruals) capture the inﬂuence of business conditions (Chan et al., 2006) and
reﬂect changes in ﬁrms’ net assets (Fairﬁeld et al., 2003; Zhang, 2007). A high (low) level of normal accruals
may be a reﬂection of strong (weak) past sales growth and investors wrongly infer that such high (low) growth
trends will last for a long time. Second, the behavioral ﬁnance perspective suggests that individuals may be too
slow in updating their beliefs when new evidence arrives (Edwards, 1968). A high level of normal accruals
makes a ﬁrm look good even when it is facing diﬃculties in its operating conditions. If investors cannot
extrapolate a ﬁrm’s operating conditions from the components of accruals, such as changes in inventories,
receivables, and payables, then the mispricing of normal accruals is likely to occur.
If investors are naı¨ve and ﬁxated on earnings, they generally cannot understand the real value or relevance
of the information embedded in accrual components (whether abnormal or normal). However, not all inves-
tors are naı¨ve. Some are able to acquire information before others and grasp the implications of public news
(Lakonishok et al., 1992; Hand, 1990). For example, institutional investors are more sophisticated than indi-
vidual investors and have a stronger capacity to acquire and process information (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989;
Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Wermers, 2000). Therefore, these informed investors are likely to be able to cor-
rectly price abnormal and normal accruals, thus leading to information asymmetry with their less sophisti-
cated counterparts. This informed trading by informed investors increases stock trading costs.
A high absolute value of abnormal accruals generally means high levels of earnings management and
information asymmetry, which lead to high trading costs. Similarly, a high absolute value of normal accruals
generally means that ﬁrms are experiencing a high or low rate of growth, which renders it easy for investors to
misestimate the tendency of earnings performance to reverse.
Accordingly, the ﬁrst set of hypotheses areis as follows.
H1a. A higher absolute value of abnormal accruals is associated with a higher stock trading cost.
H1b. A higher absolute value of normal accruals is associated with a higher stock trading cost.
Contrary to the case in the US, short-selling is constrained in the Chinese stock market. Informed investors
may thus engage in diﬀerent forms of arbitrage depending on whether ﬁrm value is underestimated or over-
estimated. When it is underestimated, these investors can beneﬁt from buying the ﬁrm’s stocks. When it is
overestimated, in contrast, they are unable to beneﬁt from short-selling in the Chinese stock market because
of short-selling constraints (Jin, 2010). Hence, more informed trading takes place when ﬁrm value is underes-
timated, which leads to higher stock trading costs.
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or downward. Informed investors in China are unable to beneﬁt from positive abnormal accruals because of
short-selling constraints, thus leading to less active informed trading. The stock trading costs incurred by
adverse selection risk are low in this case. However, when abnormal accruals are negative, ﬁrm value is under-
estimated. Informed investors can beneﬁt from buying these ﬁrms’ stocks, which leads to losses for unin-
formed investors.
Similarly, there are positive and negative normal accruals. Firm may be enjoying sales growth when normal
accruals are positive, meaning that investors may overestimate the persistence of that growth and, accordingly,
overestimate ﬁrm value (Chan et al., 2006). When these accruals are negative, in contrast, ﬁrms may be expe-
riencing weak sales growth, meaning that investors may overestimate the persistence of such weak growth and,
accordingly, underestimate ﬁrm value. Hence, negative normal accruals attract more informed trading, lead-
ing to higher stock trading costs.
The second set of hypotheses areis thus as follows.
H2a. In the short- selling-constrained Chinese stock market, negative abnormal accruals have a greater
inﬂuence on stock trading costs than positive abnormal accruals.H2b. In the short- selling-constrained Chinese stock market, negative normal accruals have a greater inﬂuence
on stock trading costs than positive normal accruals.
4. Sample selection and research design
4.1. Sample selection
The initial sample comprises all A-share ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from
2004 to 2008 according to data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
The sample initially included 1746 ﬁrms and 7295 observations. After eliminating 87 ﬁnancial industry obser-
vations, 370 IPO observations, and 358 observations with missing variables, the ﬁnal sample contains 6480
ﬁrm-year observations. Following Jiang et al. (2010), all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
The stock return data in this paper are from the CSMAR database. Financial data are from the CSMAR
and WIND databases, and high-frequency data from the China Center for Economic Research (CCER)
database.
4.2. Measurement of trading costs
Trading costs constitute one measure of liquidity. If brokerage fees and transfer taxes are excluded, there
are two kinds of trading costs (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004): proportional (quoted and eﬀective spreads) and
non-proportional (price impact). Proportional trading costs are independent of the size of the portfolio traded,
whereas non-proportional costs increase with the size of the portfolio.
Spreads are a more suitable measure of trading costs in the Chinese context because of the country’s low
degree of institutional ownership. Most trades are initiated by individual investors and are small in scale.
Zhang and Liu (2006) argue that spreads can be a direct measure of trading costs when investors make small
trades, although both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges are electronic, order-driven exchanges. He
and Niu (2009) also suggest that spreads are a typical metric of trading costs, which aﬀect investors’ invest-
ment returns. This paper therefore uses quoted and eﬀective spreads to measure trading costs in the Chinese
stock market. High-frequency data are used to construct these spreads, as follows.QSP i ¼
1
Di
XD
d¼1
1
T
XT
t¼1
Aski;t  Bidi;t
ðAski;t þ Bidi;tÞ=2 ð1Þ
ESP i ¼ 1Di
XD
d¼1
1
T
XT
t¼1
2 jPricei;t  ðAski;t þ Bidi;tÞ=2jðAski;t þ Bidi;tÞ=2 ð2Þ
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Aski,t is the lowest ask price for stock i at time t; T is the number of transactions in a day for stock i; and
Pricei,t is the price of stock i at time t.
The daily spread is ﬁrst calculated as the average intraday spread. QSP and ESP are the averages of the
daily spreads (quoted and eﬀective spreads) by year. To compute the quoted and eﬀective spreads more eﬀec-
tively and accurately, high-frequency data are ﬁrst selected according to several Chinese institutional features:
(1) trades in the call auction period are excluded because of the diﬀerent character of call and continuous auc-
tions and (2) trades that hit up or down limits are excluded because the spreads of these trades are abnormal,
and (3) trades that seem to be incorrectly recorded, such as those for which the highest bid price is larger than
the lowest ask price or for which the lowest ask price is negative, are excluded.
Moreover, ﬁnancial reporting for year t must be provided before April 30 of the next year in China. There-
fore, trades made between May 1 of year t and April 30 of year t + 1 are used to calculate the spreads for year
t.
4.3. Measurement of abnormal and normal accruals
Dechow et al. (1995) ﬁnd the modiﬁed Jones model to exhibit the greatest power in detecting earnings man-
agement. This model is thus used to obtain abnormal and normal accruals in this paper. Model (3) is estimated
for each year-industry in the sample, and the abnormal accruals in model (4) are then calculated for each ﬁrm-
year in the sample using the coeﬃcients estimated in model (3).TAi;t
Asseti;t1
¼ a1 1Asseti;t1 þ a2
DREV i;t
Asseti;t1
þ a3 PPEi;tAsseti;t1 þ ei;t ð3Þ
Abacci;t ¼ TAi;tAsseti;t1  a1
1
Asseti;t1
þ a2 DREV i;t  DRECi;tAsseti;t1 þ a3
PPEi;t
Asseti;t1
þ ei;t
 
ð4ÞIn models (3) and (4), TA is total accruals, which equal operating proﬁts minus operating cash ﬂow, Asset is
total assets, DREV is changes in sales, DREC is changes in receivables, and PPE is gross ﬁxed assets.
4.4. Regression models
The following multivariate regressions are used to test the hypotheses.Tradingcost ¼ b0 þ b1Accrualþ b2Sizeþ b3Priceþ b4Volatility þ b5Volumeþ b6Stateþ Year
þ Industry þ e ð5Þ
Tradingcost ¼ b0 þ b1jabaccj þ b2Dum1þ b3jabaccj  Dum1þ b4Sizeþ b5Priceþ b6Volatility
þ b7Volumeþ b8Stateþ Year þ Industry þ e ð6Þ
Tradingcost ¼ b0 þ b1jnoraccj þ b2Dum2þ b3jnoraccj  Dum2þ b4Sizeþ b5Priceþ b6Volatility
þ b7Volumeþ b8Stateþ Year þ Industry þ e ð7ÞIn the regressions, Tradingcost is the stock trading cost, which equals the natural logarithm of QSP and ESP;
Accrual is the components of accruals, which is equal to the absolute value of abnormal accruals (|abacc|) or
normal accruals (|noracc|). On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the sign of Accrual is predicted to be positive
in Eq. (5). Eqs. (6) and (7) examine the inﬂuence of short-selling constraints in the Chinese stock market on the
relationship between accrual components and stock trading costs. Dum1 and Dum2 are dummy variables.
When abacc is negative, Dum1 is 1, and otherwise 0. Similarly, when noracc is negative, Dum2 is 1, and other-
wise 0. As previously noted, when normal and abnormal accruals are positive, there is little informed trading
by investors because of short-selling constraints. When they are negative, in contrast, more informed trading
takes place. Therefore, negative abnormal and normal accruals exert a greater inﬂuence on stock trading costs
than positive abnormal accruals. Thus, the coeﬃcients on |abacc|  Dum1 and |noracc|  Dum2 are expected to
be positive.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Dependent variable
Tradingcost Stock trading cost = natural logarithm of QSP and ESP, which are calculated according to Eqs. (1) and (2)
Independent variables
Abacc Abnormal accruals, calculated according to Eq. (4)
|abacc| The absolute value of abnormal accruals.
Noracc Normal accruals, calculated according to Eq. (3)
|noracc| The absolute value of normal accruals
Dum1 Dummy variable; when abacc is negative, Dum1 is 1, otherwise 0
Dum2 Dummy variable; when noracc is negative, Dum2 is 1, otherwise 0
Control variables
Size Firm size = natural logarithm of total assets
Price Stock price = average stock price in the year
Volatility Return volatility = standard deviation of stock returns in the year
Volume Stock trading volume = natural logarithm of average trading volume in the year
State Dummy variable; when the ﬁrm is state-owned, State is 1, otherwise 0
Year Year ﬁxed eﬀects
Industry Industry ﬁxed eﬀects
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sure. Large ﬁrms attract more analysts than their smaller counterparts. Larger ﬁrms also feature a higher
degree of information transparency, less severe information asymmetry, and lower trading costs. The coeﬃ-
cient on Size is therefore expected be negative. Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) document more severe informa-
tion asymmetry in ﬁrms with a low stock price than in those with a high stock price. Hence, the coeﬃcient of
Price is expected to be negative. Moreover, ﬁrms with greater volatility face a higher market risk (Kanagaret-
nam et al., 2007), suggesting a positive coeﬃcient for Volatility. Firms with a large trading volume have a
higher level of liquidity, and thus, the predicted coeﬃcient of Volume is negative. The dummy variable State
is included to capture the diﬀerence in properties between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs in
China. Year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects are also included in the multivariate regressions.
Table 1 is the variable deﬁnitions.5. Empirical results
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables. QSP and ESP are about 0.3% in China, similar to
the values calculated by Chung et al. (2010), who report an average quoted spread (eﬀective spread) of 0.36%
(0.26%) for their NYSE/AMEX sample and 2.17% (1.54%) for their NASDAQ sample. The spreads in China
are much lower than those in the NASDAQ stock market, suggesting that they are lower in an order-drivenTable 2
Summary statistics.
Variables N Mean Median Std. Min Max p25 p75
QSP 6480 0.0028 0.0026 0.0011 0.0010 0.0067 0.0019 0.0033
ESP 6480 0.0028 0.0027 0.0011 0.0011 0.0069 0.0020 0.0033
Abacc 6480 0.0060 0.0008 0.1080 0.4081 0.3375 0.0517 0.0460
|abacc| 6480 0.0742 0.0488 0.0788 0.0000 0.4081 0.0216 0.0964
Noracc 6480 0.0151 0.0220 0.0720 0.1874 0.4363 0.0459 0.0014
|noracc| 6480 0.0449 0.0311 0.0583 0.0000 0.4363 0.0141 0.0544
Size 6480 21.3690 21.2917 1.0757 18.8266 24.6572 20.6479 22.0085
Price 6480 9.0480 6.9313 7.0346 2.1112 42.7328 4.7560 10.6374
Volatility 6480 0.0340 0.0327 0.0096 0.0164 0.0575 0.0261 0.0417
Volume 6480 14.8160 14.8097 1.0788 12.3699 17.4565 14.0146 15.5902
State 6480 0.6662 1.0000 0.4716 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
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minimum values are 0.4081 and 0.0000, respectively, suggesting that the sample ﬁrms have very diﬀerent levels
of earnings management. The sign of the mean of abnormal accruals, abacc, is negative, which suggests that
downward earnings management is widespread among Chinese listed ﬁrms.
The summary results for the control variables are as follows:. The mean of stock price is 9.0480, which is far
less than that in the US. The mean of stock volatility is 0.0340, which is higher than that among NYSE/
AMEX ﬁrms (0.0239) but lower than that among NASDAQ ﬁrms (0.0460) (Chung et al., 2010). The reason
for the discrepancy may be the entrepreneurial nature of many ﬁrms listed on the NASDAQ, as such ﬁrms
face higher risks. The mean of State is 0.6662, suggesting that more than half the sample ﬁrms are state-owned.
Table 3 presents the Pearson (bottom)/Spearman (top) correlations between variables. The Pearson corre-
lation between spreads and the absolute value of abnormal accruals is signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level.
The Spearman correction between spreads and the absolute value of normal accruals is also signiﬁcantly posi-
tive at the 1% level. The correlations between spreads and Size, Price and Volume are negative, which is con-
sistent with expectations. Surprisingly, however, those between spreads and Volatility are negative, contrary to
expectations.
Table 4 presents the results of a grouping test. Sample ﬁrms are considered high absolute value ﬁrms if their
absolute value of normal (abnormal) accruals areis higher than the median, and otherwise as low absolute
value ﬁrms. The trading costs between the high and low absolute value subsamples are then compared. Con-
sistent with expectations, QSP and ESP are signiﬁcantly higher in the former, as shown in Table 4.
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions of abnormal and normal accruals on trading costs. The coef-
ﬁcients on |abacc| and |noracc| are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, which suggests that both abnormal and
normal accruals increase spreads in the Chinese stock market. Among the control variables, the coeﬃcients on
Size are signiﬁcantly negative, consistent with expectations, indicating that larger ﬁrms have less information
asymmetry and lower spreads. Those on Price are also signiﬁcantly negative, also consistent with expectations,
which suggests that ﬁrms with a higher stock price have less information asymmetry and lower spreads. The
coeﬃcients on Volume, too, are signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting that a higher trading volume can reduce
spreads. Interestingly, and contrary to expectations, the coeﬃcients on Volatility are negative, perhaps because
investors are able to obtain more information from highly volatile ﬁrms.Table 3
Pearson (bottom)/spearman (top) correlations between variables.
Variables QSP ESP |abacc| |noracc| Size Price Volatility Volume State
QSP 1 0.9861 0.0156 0.0559 0.4356 0.6202 0.4047 0.6416 0.0828
(<0.001) (0.209) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ESP 0.9720 1 0.0225 0.0560 0.4339 0.6089 0.3534 0.5959 0.0843
(<0.001) (0.070) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
|abacc| 0.0491 0.0568 1 0.148 0.0666 0.0412 0.119 0.0266 0.0816
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.032) (<0.001)
|noracc| 0.0134 0.0203 0.4314 1 0.0713 0.1297 0.0193 0.0551 0.029
(0.281) (0.103) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.121) (<0.001) (0.019)
Size 0.4485 0.4387 0.0672 0.0519 1 0.1895 0.0124 0.466 0.2677
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.319) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Price 0.4183 0.4021 0.0677 0.0284 0.2256 1 0.4182 0.1599 0.0209
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.022) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.093)
Volatility 0.3732 0.3209 0.1446 0.1349 0.0081 0.3257 1 0.5431 0.0797
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.513) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Volume 0.6174 0.5606 0.0287 0.0784 0.5007 0.0901 0.5179 1 0.0857
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.021) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
State 0.0867 0.086 0.0947 0.0302 0.2747 0.0194 0.0779 0.0929 1
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.015) (<0.001) (0.118) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Table 4
Grouping test results.
High Low Diﬀerence (t-test)
Panel A: grouping according to |abacc|
QSP 0.0027823 0.0027326 0.0000497*
ESP 0.0028372 0.0027821 0.000055**
N 3240 3240
Panel B: grouping according to |noracc|
QSP 0.0028017 0.0027132 0.0000885***
ESP 0.0028473 0.0027719 0.0000754***
N 3240 3240
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
Table 5
Regressions of abnormal and normal accruals on stock trading costs.
Variables lnQSP lnQSP lnQSP lnESP lnESP lnESP
|abacc| 0.3240*** 0.2660*** 0.3210*** 0.2670***
(7.85) (5.98) (7.79) (5.95)
|noracc| 0.3590*** 0.2200*** 0.3460*** 0.2070***
(6.84) (3.89) (6.80) (3.73)
Size 0.0476*** 0.0508*** 0.0486*** 0.0441*** 0.0473*** 0.0451***
(10.48) (11.13) (10.66) (9.68) (10.31) (9.85)
Price 0.0217*** 0.0212*** 0.0215*** 0.0208*** 0.0204*** 0.0207***
(27.02) (26.48) (26.76) (26.87) (26.30) (26.59)
Volatility 2.2740*** 2.0450*** 2.3050*** 1.2690* 1.038 1.2990**
(3.43) (3.08) (3.48) (1.93) (1.57) (1.99)
Volume 0.1730*** 0.1710*** 0.1720*** 0.1580*** 0.1560*** 0.1570***
(28.62) (28.31) (28.53) (26.59) (26.29) (26.51)
State 0.0044 0.0059 0.0043 0.0011 0.0027 0.0010
(0.65) (0.90) (0.65) (0.60) (0.40) (0.15)
Year Control Control Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control
Constant 2.1360*** 2.0800*** 2.1210*** 2.4640*** 2.4090*** 2.4500***
(26.93) (26.14) (26.63) (31.10) (30.27) (30.78)
N 6480 6480 6480 6480 6480 6480
Adj_R2 0.642 0.641 0.643 0.575 0.573 0.575
F 518.4 513.1 496.9 350.5 345.8 335.4
The t-values in parentheses are based on White’s (1980) adjustment for heteroskedasticity.
*** Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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Stock trading costs are less inﬂuenced by positive accruals because informed investors cannot beneﬁt from
short-selling in China. When abnormal and normal accruals are negative, in contrast, investors underestimate
ﬁrm value, meaning that informed investors are likely to buy stock. In this case, uninformed investors face an
adverse selection risk. Spreads are increased to protect them, thus leading to higher trading costs. Table 6 pre-
sents empirical evidence to support this argument. For the sake of brevity, QSP (in log) is used as the depen-
dent variable in these regression models, although the conclusions are the same when the dependent variable is
ESP (in log). Models (1) and (4) in Table 6 are regressions of negative abnormal and normal accruals on stock
trading costs. The coeﬃcients on both |abacc| and |noracc| are positive. Models (2) and (5) are regressions of
positive abnormal and normal accruals on stock trading costs. The coeﬃcient on |abacc| is not signiﬁcant,
whereas that on |noracc| is signiﬁcantly positive. Models (3) and (6) are regressions with the interaction vari-
Table 6
Regressions of short-selling constraints on the relationship between accruals and stock trading costs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables lnQSP lnQSP lnQSP lnQSP lnQSP lnQSP
|abacc| 0.5350*** 0.0905 0.0051
(10.03) (1.44) (0.08)
Dum1 0.0257***
(3.17)
|abacc|  Dum1 0.4930***
(6.18)
|noracc| 0.7180*** 0.2450*** 0.2070***
(6.56) (3.71) (3.79)
Dum2 0.0213**
(2.46)
|noracc|  Dum2 0.6010***
(5.13)
Size 0.0637*** 0.0276*** 0.0477*** 0.0439*** 0.0539*** 0.0503***
(10.26) (4.28) (10.67) (8.13) (6.64) (11.01)
Price 0.0218*** 0.0202*** 0.0204*** 0.0268*** 0.0153*** 0.0211***
(14.13) (22.08) (25.44) (20.99) (16.15) (26.23)
Volatility 3.9440*** 1.3050 2.7000*** 1.0500 2.2350* 1.9370***
(4.35) (1.35) (4.12) (1.30) (1.82) (2.92)
Volume 0.1510*** 0.1960*** 0.1710*** 0.1610*** 0.2120*** 0.1720***
(18.34) (22.79) (28.71) (22.46) (20.80) (28.32)
State 0.0028 0.0101 0.0046 0.0102 0.0054 0.0064
(0.31) (1.08) (0.70) (1.30) (0.46) (0.97)
Year Control Control Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control
Constant 2.0690*** 2.2520*** 2.1640*** 2.3560*** 1.5100*** 2.0790***
(18.83) (20.94) (27.75) (25.00) (10.55) (26.11)
N 3262 3218 6480 4794 1686 6480
Adj_R2 0.658 0.645 0.65 0.621 0.709 0.642
F 283.3 272.7 495.5 325.4 201.9 471.9
The t-values within parentheses are based on White’s (1980) adjustment for heteroskedasticity.
*** Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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suggesting that negative accruals have a greater eﬀect on trading costs than positive accruals. Interestingly, the
coeﬃcient on |abacc| is not signiﬁcant in Model (2), whereas that on |noracc| is signiﬁcantly positive in Model
(5). A possible explanation is that some investors understand the value relevance of positive normal accruals
and thus sell these stocks, leading to an increase in both information asymmetry and spreads. However, few
investors understand the value relevance of positive abnormal accruals, thus the degree of information asym-
metry between investors is low, and there is no signiﬁcant change in spreads when these accruals increase.
6. Additional tests and robustness tests
6.1. Additional tests of Chinese stock market eﬃciency
As previously discussed, a low degree of market eﬃciency can lead to the mispricing of positive and neg-
ative abnormal accruals. If investors are naı¨ve and ﬁxated on earnings, they are likely to overestimate earnings
with positive abnormal accruals and underestimate earnings with negative abnormal accruals. In this section,
the results of market eﬃciency tests that distinguish positive or negative abnormal accruals from earnings in
the Chinese stock market are reported. The full sample is split into two groups according to whether ﬁrms’
abnormal accruals are negative or not. Each group is sorted by accounting earnings and decomposed into
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als and then split into two groups of the same size to ensure that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in earnings
between the two groups but a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in abnormal accruals. If no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in market
returns is found between the two groups, the implication is that investors in China are naı¨ve, ﬁxated on earn-
ings, and unable to distinguish abnormal accruals from earnings. Table 7 presents the empirical results. Most
of the t-values are insigniﬁcant, suggesting a low degree of market eﬃciency in China. The country’s investors
cannot distinguish abnormal accruals from earnings.
Weak market eﬃciency may also be associated with the mispricing of positive and negative normal accruals.
Firms may be undergoing a growth period when these accruals are positive and investors may optimistically
believe that the high rate of growth will last for a long time (Chan et al., 2006), leading to overestimation of ﬁrm
value. Similarly, ﬁrms may be in ﬁnancial diﬃculty when normal accruals are negative and investors may pes-
simistically believe that the diﬃculty will persist, leading to underestimation of ﬁrm value. Following Sloan
(1996), the rational expectations model is used to test whether stock prices reﬂect the information on future earn-
ings contained in positive and negative normal accruals. More speciﬁcally, Eqs. (8) and (9) are used to test the
market mispricing of the persistence of positive and negative normal accruals. Earningst+1 is operating earnings
in t + 1.Cash is operating cash ﬂow in year t.Noracc+ = Noracc ifNoracc > 0, otherwise 0.Noracc = Noracc if
Noracc < 0, otherwise 0. ARt+1 is the buy- and-hold return fromMay 1 in year t + 1 to April 30 in year t + 2. IfTable 7
Market eﬃciency test distinguishing negative or positive abnormal accruals from earnings.
Abacc < 0 AbaccP 0
Bhar Bhar
Low High t-value Low High t-value
group1 0.2379 0.2379 0.79 0.0156 0.1341 1.08
group2 0.0889 0.0195 0.64 0.0867 0.0637 1.05
group3 0.1427 0.1870 0.25 0.1831 0.0578 1.88*
group4 0.0791 0.1613 0.83 0.0158 0.1073 0.71
group5 0.0206 0.0646 0.40 0.0908 0.2773 1.17
group6 0.2218 0.1005 2.57** 0.1819 0.0796 0.70
group7 0.0491 0.0075 0.35 0.1099 0.0393 0.53
group8 0.1098 0.2307 2.35** 0.0959 0.0195 0.84
group9 0.1540 0.1878 0.24 0.0733 0.0472 0.96
group10 0.1008 0.1410 0.29 0.0915 0.0822 0.07
group11 0.0659 0.0378 0.89 0.0094 0.0335 0.18
group12 0.0878 0.0564 0.24 0.0367 0.0916 0.40
group13 0.3424 0.0350 1.81* 0.1729 0.0578 2.10**
group14 0.0675 0.0578 1.13 0.1072 0.1802 2.25**
group15 0.1065 0.0552 0.42 0.1740 0.1069 2.73***
group16 0.1162 0.1157 0.00 0.0351 0.2751 1.70*
group17 0.4071 0.0870 1.79* 0.0935 0.0813 1.67*
group18 0.0035 0.0950 0.81 0.0554 0.1269 0.58
group19 0.1743 0.1918 0.14 0.0304 0.0631 0.78
group20 0.1724 0.1096 0.42 0.0838 0.0532 1.08
group21 0.1145 0.0117 1.11 0.1499 0.0127 1.32
group22 0.0080 0.0469 0.35 0.1906 0.0600 0.89
group23 0.0556 0.0470 1.02 0.0689 0.1524 1.84*
group24 0.0489 0.1770 1.17 0.0052 0.0681 0.61
group25 0.1462 0.1203 0.21 0.0807 0.0802 1.51
group26 0.1762 0.0367 1.07 0.0031 0.2241 1.80*
group27 0.1479 0.0988 0.37 0.1130 0.1403 0.19
group28 0.1893 0.2098 0.17 0.2623 0.3429 0.43
group29 0.3696 0.0870 2.16** 0.0658 0.0523 0.11
group30 0.3256 0.1640 1.08 0.3044 0.2781 0.17
*** Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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niﬁcantly from b3, and b

4 diﬀers signiﬁcantly from b4. Investors overestimate the persistence of a ﬁrm’s growth
and sluggishness if b3 is signiﬁcantly greater than b3 and b

4 is signiﬁcantly greater than b4.Table
Estima
b
b0
b1
b2
b3
b4
*** De
** Den
* DenEarningstþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1Cashþ b2Abaccþ b3Noraccþ þ b4Noracc þ e ð8Þ
ARtþ1 ¼ b Earningstþ1  b0  b1Cash b2Abacc b3Noraccþ  b4Noracc
 þ l ð9Þ
Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of the market pricing of positive and negative normal accruals
with respect to their implications for one-year-ahead earnings. Coeﬃcient b3 is 1.2385, signiﬁcantly greater
than b3, which is 0.5295, suggesting that investors overestimate the persistence of positive normal accruals.
Similarly, coeﬃcient b4 is 0.9346, signiﬁcantly greater than b4, which is 0.4876, suggesting that investors over-
estimate the persistence of negative normal accruals. Overall, investors overestimate the persistence of a ﬁrm’s
current operating conditions, thus leading to the mispricing of normal accruals.
6.2. Robustness tests
6.2.1. Results based on non-proportional trading costs (the price eﬀect)
The empirical results reported thus far are based on proportional trading costs (quoted and eﬀective
spreads). As a robustness test, the relationship between accruals and non-proportional trading costs (the price
eﬀect) are also investigated. Following Amihud (2002) and Hasbrouck (2009), an illiquidity measure is used to
estimate the price eﬀect of trades:Priceimpact ¼ 1
D
XD
d¼1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
jRd j
RMBVOLd
 106
s
ð10ÞD is the sum of days with nonzero volume from May 1 of year t to April 30 of year t + 1. R and RMBVOL are
the return and trading amount, respectively, on days with nonzero volume. A higher Priceimpact implies high-
er non-proportional trading costs. The foregoing regressions are run again using Priceimpact as the dependent
variable, but the conclusions remain unchanged.
6.2.2. Robust test following Bhattacharya et al. (2008)
Bhattacharya et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between earnings quality and trading costs using a
sample of US ﬁrms. They measure earnings quality with the modiﬁed Dechow and Dichev (2002) model used
in Francis et al. (2005), and ﬁnd that poor earnings quality increases adverse selection risk, as manifested in
trading costs, and reduces liquidity in ﬁnancial markets. In a second robustness test, the methodology of Bhat-
tacharya et al. (2008) is used and the same conclusions are reached for the Chinese ﬁrms in the sample. More-
over, following Dechow and Dichev (2002), Francis et al. (2004) and Lang et al. (2012), further ﬁrm intrinsic
(innate) factors are controlled for in the regressions, including ﬁrm size, capital intensity, operating cycle, cash
ﬂow variability, sales variability and the incidence of losses. The coeﬃcients on accrual quality decrease dras-8
tion of the market pricing of positive and negative normal accruals with respect to their implications for one-year-ahead earnings.
Forecast equation Return equation Market eﬃciency test
Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat Chi2 P > Chi2
1.2476*** 11.30
0.0105*** 6.91 b0* 0.1258*** 7.75
0.6210*** 51.65 b1* 1.1647*** 11.85 b1 = b1* 30.17*** 0.0000
0.4838*** 43.43 b2* 1.0994*** 11.42 b2 = b2* 40.33*** 0.0000
0.5295*** 26.83 b3* 1.2385*** 8.04 b3 = b3* 20.84*** 0.0000
0.4876*** 15.98 b4* 0.9346*** 4.23 b4 = b4* 4.01** 0.0451
note statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
ote statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
ote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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process or the accounting system used to measure that process, can lead to higher trading costs.
7. Conclusion
Accruals provide investors with useful information about ﬁrm value. In China, however, not all investors
can understand accrual information because of the country’s low degree of market eﬃciency. In this paper, I
ﬁnd that investors in China misunderstand both abnormal and normal accruals. A higher absolute value of
abnormal (normal) accruals is associated with higher stock trading costs. Moreover, under the short-selling
constraints that prevail in the Chinese stock market, negative abnormal (normal) accruals have a greater eﬀect
on stock trading costs than positive abnormal (normal) accruals.
This paper has implications for accounting theory, securities regulation, and investment. First, the empir-
ical evidence presented herein shows that the basic function of accounting is not only to provide a reliable
record (of abnormal accruals, for example), but also to reﬂect economic reality. Trading costs will increase
in the securities market if investors cannot understand a ﬁrm’s economic reality (such as normal accruals).
Second, this paper also shows that full disclosure, as suggested by the information perspective, is limited
regardless of the disclosure form. Both the information and measurement perspectives should be considered
when providing accounting information in a weak eﬃciency market. Third, I ﬁnd market eﬃciency is weak in
China and investors are naı¨ve and ﬁxated on earnings. Thus, to help Chinese investors to correctly price earn-
ings, the government should increase the number of security analysts and the ownership level of institutional
investors. Finally, the results presented in this paper imply that investors should pay close attention to both
abnormal and normal accruals to avoid investment losses. Future research should consider the eﬀects of short-
selling constraints on the other economic consequences of earnings quality in China.
References
Aﬄeck-Graves, J., Callahan, C.M., Chipalkatti, N., 2002. Earnings predictability, information asymmetry, and market liquidity. Journal
of Accounting Research 40 (3), 561–583.
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series eﬀects. Journal of Financial Markets 5, 31–56.
Baiman, S., Verrecchia, R., 1996. The relation among capital markets, ﬁnancial disclosure, production eﬃciency, and insider trading.
Journal of Accounting Research 34, 1–22.
Bernard, V., Thomas, J., 1990. Evidence that stock prices do not fully reﬂect the implications of current earnings for future earnings.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 305–340.
Bhattacharya, N., Desai, H., Venkataraman, K., 2008. Earnings Quality and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from Trading Costs.
SSRN Working Paper. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266351>.
Biais, B., Glosten, L., Spatt, C., 2005. Market microstructure: a survey of microfoundations, empirical results and policy implications.
Journal of Financial Markets 8 (2), 217–264.
Bradshaw, M.T., Richardson, S.A., Sloan, R.G., 2001. Do analysts and auditors use information in accruals? Journal of Accounting
Research 39, 45–74.
Chan, K., Chan, L., Jegadeesh, N., Lakonishok, J., 2006. Earnings quality and stock returns. Journal of Business 79 (3), 1041–1082.
Chan, L.K.C., Karceski, J., Lakonishok, J., 2003. The level and persistence of growth rates. Journal of Finance 58, 643–684.
Chung, K.H., Elder, J., Kim, J., 2010. Corporate governance and liquidity. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45 (2), 265–
291.
De Bondt, W.F.M., Thaler, R.H., 1990. Do security analysts overreact? American Economic Review 80, 52–57.
Dechow, P., 1994. Accounting earnings and cash ﬂow as measures of ﬁrm performance: the role of accounting accruals. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 18, 3–42.
Dechow, P., Dichev, I., 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77, 35–
59.
Dechow, P., Ge, W., Schrand, C., 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their
consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, 344–401.
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G., Sweeney, A.P., 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review 70, 193–225.
Diamond, D., 1985. Optimal release of information by ﬁrms. Journal of Finance 40, 1071–1094.
Easley, D., O’Hara, M., 2004. Information and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance 59 (4), 1553–1583.
Edwards, W., 1968. Conservatism in human information processing. In: Kleinmuntz, B. (Ed.), Formal Representation in Human
Judgment. Wiley, New York.
Fairﬁeld, P., Whisenant, S., Yohn, T., 2003. Accrued earnings and growth: implications for future proﬁtability and market mispricing. The
Accounting Review 78, 353–371.
300 Q. Lei / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 287–300Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., Schipper, K., 2004. Cost of equity and earnings attributes. The Accounting Review 79, 967–1010.
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., Schipper, K., 2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39,
295–327.
Francis, J.R., Maydew, E.L., Sparks, H.C., 1999. The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible reporting of accruals. Auditing: A Journal of
Practice and Theory 18, 17–34.
Ge, J., 2003. What are the characteristic essence, basic functions and boundaries of ﬁnancial accounting? Accounting Research 3, 3–7 (in
Chinese).
Grinblatt, M., Titman, S., 1989. Mutual fund performance: an analysis of quarterly portfolio holdings. Journal of Business 62, 393–416.
Grossman, S., Stiglitz, J., 1980. On the impossibility of informationally eﬃcient markets. American Economic Review 70, 393–408.
Hand, J., 1990. A test of the extended functional ﬁxation hypothesis. The Accounting Review 65, 740–763.
Hasbrouck, J., 2009. Trading costs and returns for U.S. equities: estimating eﬀective costs from daily data. Journal of Finance 64 (3),
1445–1477.
He, X., Niu, H., 2009. The externality of liquidity and inverse selection. Management World 7, 56–66 (in Chinese).
Jayaraman, S., 2008. Earnings volatility, cash ﬂow volatility, and informed trading. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (4), 809–851.
Jiang, G., Lee, C., Yue, H., 2010. Tunneling through intercorporate loans: the China experience. Journal of Financial Economics 98, 1–20.
Jin, Z., 2010. New accounting standard, accounting information quality and stock price synchronicity. Accounting Research 7, 19–26 (in
Chinese).
Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G., Whalen, D., 2007. Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly
earnings announcements? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 26, 497–522.
Korajczyk, R.A., Sadka, R., 2004. Are momentum proﬁts robust to trading cost? The Journal of Finance 59 (3), 1039–1082.
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1992. The impact of institutional trading on stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (1),
23–43.
Lang, M., Lins, K., Maﬀett, M., 2012. Transparency, liquidity, and valuation: international evidence on when transparency matters most.
Journal of Accounting Research 50, 729–774.
Lang, M., Lundholm, R., 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research
31 (2), 246–271.
Lei, G., Liu, H., 2007. Nature of controlling shareholders, tunneling and magnitude of earnings management. China Industrial Economy
8, 90–97 (in Chinese).
Maines, L., Hand, J., 1996. Individuals’ perceptions and misperceptions of time series properties of quarterly earnings. The Accounting
Review 71, 317–336.
Mishkin, F., 1983. A Rational Expectations Approach to Macroeconometrics: Testing Policy Eﬀectiveness and Eﬃcient Markets Models.
University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago, IL.
Nofsinger, J., Sias, R.W., 1999. Herding and feedback trading by institutional and individual investors. Journal of Finance 54, 2263–2295.
Richardson, S., Sloan, R., Soliman, M., Tuna, I., 2005. Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices. Journal of Accounting
and Economics 39, 437–485.
Shleifer, A., 2000. Ineﬃcient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sloan, R.G., 1996. Do stock prices fully reﬂect information in accruals and cash ﬂows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71
(3), 289–315.
Song, Y., Li, Z., 2009. The abnormality in accruals in A-share companies. Management World 8, 17–24, in Chinese.
Subramanyam, K., 1996. The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22, 249–281.
Thomas, J.K., Zhang, H., 2002. Inventory changes and future returns. Review of Accounting Studies 7, 163–187.
Venkatesh, P., Chiang, R., 1986. Information asymmetry and the dealer’s bid-ask spread: a case study of earnings and dividend
announcements. Journal of Finance 41 (5), 1089–1102.
Verrecchia, R., 1982. The use of mathematical models in ﬁnancial accounting. Journal of Accounting Research 20, 1–42.
Wang, K., Lian, P., 2010. Does the sponsor system improve the earnings quality of IPO ﬁrms? Management World 8, 21–34 (in Chinese).
Wermers, R., 2000. Mutual fund performance: an empirical decomposition into stock-picking talent, style, transaction costs, and expenses.
Journal of Finance 55, 1655–1695.
Xie, H., 2001. The mispricing of abnormal accruals. The Accounting Review 76 (3), 357–373.
Zhang, G., Zhao, J., 2008. Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and capital market reactions. Accounting Research 3, 51–57 (in
Chinese).
Zhang, W., 2010. Private oﬀerings and earnings management. Management World 1, 54–63 (in Chinese).
Zhang, X., 2007. Accruals, investment, and the accrual anomaly. The Accounting Review 82, 1333–1363.
Zhang, X., Hu, D., 2008. Do China’s listed ﬁrms with a loss smooth income in the fourth quarter? China Accounting Review 3, 309–320
(in Chinese).
Zhang, Z., Liu, L., 2006. Turnovers and stock returns: liquidity premium or speculative bubbles? China Economic Quarterly 3, 871–892
(in Chinese).
